Introduction
"In the US, the fees investment banks charge to underwrite share offerings have not changed in more than a decade. In Britain, fixed underwriting fees are the subject of an antitrust investigation, which began hearing this month. Studies in both countries suggest issuing companies are overcharged." Anonymous, The Economist, 27 June 1998.
Despite intensive competition within the underwriting industry, recent media releases alleged that underwriters in the US and UK collude and fix underwriting fees. The practice of fixing underwriting fees in the UK is not a new phenomenon. Levis (1990) notes that the underwriting fee structure in the UK is almost uniform across underwriters irrespective of the type, nature, and risk profile of the issuing company. Recently, Chen and Ritter (1999) show that underwriters in the US charged exactly seven percent for 90 percent of initial public offering (IPOs) raising between $20 and $80 million from 1995 to 1998. The spread is triple the amount a decade earlier and about twice as high as in other countries. One of the explanations that they propose for the high underwriter spread is the implicit collusion amongst underwriters in the US.
As a result of Chen and Ritter's paper, an antitrust investigation has also begun in the US.
To provide further international insights into the credibility of the underwriting industry, this paper investigates how underwriting fees in Australia are set. Specifically, we test whether underwriters in Australia price their services systematically according to several readily observable variables, some of which proxy for the risk and cost of underwriting an equity offer.
Little attention has been paid to the pricing of underwriting services in the academic literature.
As underwriting fees constitute a large component of the total costs typically incurred in a public issue in Australia, 1 an investigation on how underwriters price their services is thus highly warranted.
In an early attempt, Pugel and White (1988) find that various proxies for underwriting cost and issuer-specific risk explain some of the variance in the underwriting fees. James (1992) shows that the optimal pricing for underwriting services is to provide an initial discount in the fees in the hope of locking into a bi-monopolistic relationship with the issuer and earning quasirents in subsequent engagements. In Jain and Kini (1999) , the underwriter spread is negatively related to managerial ownership, providing support for the monitoring role of the underwriter in IPO firms.
The development of an Australian fee model is motivated by several characteristics unique to the Australian market setting. For example, all IPOs in Australia are issues-cum-listings and underwritten on a standby agreement basis. Further, the offer price and size have to be set and disclosed in the prospectus prior to its circulation. These institutional characteristics also provide an opportunity to test the robustness of the underwriter fee model previously developed in the US setting.
Several legislative changes have occurred within the last 15 years in the Australian capital market. Most noteworthy, the enactment of the Corporations Law in 1991 introduces the underwriter as a potential party whom a legal action can be brought against in cases of misleading or omission of material information in prospectuses. This allows us to investigate whether the extension of legal liability to underwriters has an impact on the underwriting fees charged in the post-Corporations Law period vis-à-vis the pre-Corporations Law period.
Our sample consists of 282 underwritten industrial IPOs that were listed during the period January 1980 to January 1996. We find that the offer size, the subscription period of the issue, the retained ownership after the IPO, and whether underwriters receive options as part of their compensation significantly explain the variance in underwriting fees in Australia. Our results do not provide evidence that underwriters in Australia collude or fix underwriting fees. Overall, we find that underwriting services in Australia are priced to compensate underwriters for the cost of underwriting and the risk of suffering capital loss in the event of undersubscription -a feature that is unique in standby underwriting agreements.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional background of the Australian IPO market, with an emphasis on the underwriting process. Section 3 provides a review of previous literature. Section 4 discusses the fee model. Our data and sample profile are presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the results and we conclude in Section 7.
Institutional Background
In contrast to the US, companies making an IPO in Australia have to request for admission to the Official List of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) at the time of the offer. This is referred to as issues-cum-listings [Finn and Higham (1988) ]. All offers of shares to the public must be made under the cover of a prospectus, which contains, amongst other information relating to the issuing firm, an underwriting agreement if the issue is underwritten. The underwriting agreement typically states the underwritten amount, the underwriting fee and whether the issuer will indemnify the underwriter against all liabilities, costs and expenses incurred by the underwriter in relation to the issue. It also prescribes escape clauses under which the underwriter will not soak up the shortfall in demand. 2 These clauses are fairly standard in most prospectuses.
In Australia, underwriting services are typically provided by brokerage firms and investment banks, and to a lesser extent, commercial banks, life and general insurance companies. Unlike the US, where IPOs are underwritten on a "firm commitment" or a "best effort" basis, IPOs in Australia are underwritten on a "standby agreement" contract. In the event that the offer is not fully subscribed, underwriters in Australia are liable to meet the shortfall in demand by purchasing the unsubscribed shares at the offer price. The standby contract is somewhat similar to the firm commitment basis of underwriting except that the latter requires the underwriter to purchase the issue upfront, repackage the issue and sell (and distribute) it to the public. In the best effort contract, the underwriter receives fees in proportion to the issue distributed [see Ritter (1987) ].
Setting the issue price is by far the most complex part of the IPO process and is typically done in negotiation between the issuer and the underwriter. One distinguishing feature of the Australian IPO process is that the offer price (and issue size) has to be determined and clearly stated in the prospectus before the offer document can be circulated to the public.
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The underwriter (and the issuer) is locked into this offer price regardless of subsequent market movements. This is similar to the offer for sales at fixed price method in the UK [ Levis (1990) ].
The average time delay between the date of prospectus registration and the commencement of trading on the exchange is 68 days in Australia [How (1994) ]. Therefore, the risk of having to meet the shortfall in demand for IPOs is expected to be higher in Australia than in the US. This is further compounded by the fact that formalised pre-selling activities to the public at large are prohibited in Australia.
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Another aspect where the Australian capital market is different from that in the US is in its legal environment. Anderson, Francis and Stokes (1993) note that Australia has a much less litigious environment than the US. This is primarily due to the two jurisdictions operating under different legal systems. Relative to the US, the availability of a class of action to challenge the underwriter in Australia is much more restrictive [Law and Cullum (1999) ]. The fact that 2 Most clauses prescribe specific contingencies under which the underwriter can withdraw from the underwriting agreement. These contingencies include changes in market conditions, changes in law, failure to comply with the Corporations Law and ASX Listing Rules, a breach of significant contracts, insolvency and indictable offence committed by directors. 3 In the US, the offer price is not set until the day before official date of listing. 4 Section 1078 of the Corporations Law prohibits promoters of the prospectus from "going from place to place" to offer securities for subscription or purchased. Section 1077 indicates that the phrase "going from place to place" includes communication done litigants in Australia must launch and fund their own actions further deters shareholders from bringing a lawsuit against the underwriter. Our underwriting fee model is therefore expected to be less noisy than that in the US as it is less affected by potential lawsuits. Pugel and White (1988) examine the determinants of underwriting fees in the US using firm-commitment basis IPOs listed in the first six months of 1981. They find that various proxies for underwriting cost and issuer-specific risk explain a significant fraction of the variance in the underwriting fees. The two proxies for underwriting cost they look at are the offer size and the complexity of the issue. For a given dollar amount of underwriting fee, the larger the number of securities offered, the smaller the proportion of underwriting fee per share.
Literature Review
In contrast to a "pure vanilla" issue, the negotiation process between the issuer and the underwriter for a more complex issue is likely to be longer. Also, a more complex issue is likely to entail greater effort by the underwriter in promoting and marketing the issue to the public.
Thus, the underwriter is likely to take into account the complexity of the issue when determining the underwriting fee.
In considering the risk inherent in underwriting an issue, Pugel and White find that the underwriter is particularly concerned with the issuer-specific risk. The issuer's size and age are the two proxies for such risk. As investors and the underwriter are more familiar with larger and older issuing firms, the underwriting risk associated with such issues is lower.
Interestingly, in Pugel and White's study, the presence of lead underwriters significantly reduces the underwriting fees. They define leading underwriters as the largest 25 underwriters in terms of the volume of IPOs underwritten in their sample period. In line with Logue and Lindvall (1974) and Stoll (1976) , they advance the competitive hypothesis. They argue that an issuer capable of attracting the service of a lead underwriter has the advantage of obtaining a lower underwriting fee than an issuer whose new offer is underwritten by a small, local underwriting firm. The presence of a lead underwriter is thus indicative of the competitive environment in which the issue is underwritten. This is also supported in Muhammad, Iftekhar, and Smith (1986) who find that competition amongst underwriters significantly lowers the via "eligible communication service". However, these sections do not apply to invitations to subscribe for an amount of at least $500,000 by each person; s66(3)(a)(ba).
underwriting fee. However, once ex post market volatility is controlled for, the proxy for competition is no longer significant.
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The competitive hypothesis appears to be counter-intuitive to our understanding that prestigious underwriters are inherently more costly. Booth and Smith (1986) , Smith (1986) , and Beveniste and Spindt (1989) argue that as prestigious underwriters tend to bring more reputational assets to the issuance process, they should be compensated more. Similarly, Gilson and Krrakman (1984) , Booth and Smith (1986) , and Tinic (1988) advocate that prestigious underwriters tend to extract higher fee from issuers in order to maintain their investment in reputational capital. Further, How (1994) suggests that prestigious underwriters tend to charge a premium to reflect the higher quality services they provide.
The underwriting fee may also be set in light of future dealings with the client. James (1992) examines the pricing of underwriting services in the context of a long-term relationship between the underwriter and the issuer. He proposes that the underwriter must first acquire relationship-specific information in setting the issue price. This process often involves costly set-up expenses. The capitalisation of these expenses results in relationship-specific assets, which are neither transferable nor marketable.
The optimal pricing of services that acquire relationship-specific assets has its origin in the auditing literature [Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) , Farrell and Shapiro (1989) and DeAngelo (1981) ], and is known as low balling. Formally stated, DeAngelo (1981) refers low balling to a situation where the supplier of services, due to competition, provides a discount in the initial fee with the expectation of earning quasi-rents in subsequent dealings with the recipient of services. James first attempts to study low balling effects on underwriting fee. He uses variables which Pugel and White found to be significant in explaining the pattern of the underwriter spreads in the IPO market. Using shares-only IPOs in the US market from 1980 to 1983, he finds evidence of low balling in the underwriting industry.
In Jain and Kini (1999) , the effect of underwriter monitoring role in the IPO market on the underwriting fee is examined. They find a negative association between the underwriter spread and retained ownership (and institutional ownership). Following Jensen and Meckling (1976) , they conjecture that IPO firms with higher retained ownership have less agency problems. The negative relationship between the underwriter spread and ownership therefore suggests that 5 The degree of actual or potential competition faced by the underwriter is proxied by the number of competing underwriters for each $100 million offerings in a given 3-digit SIC industry code. It is also possible that high reputation underwriters are associated with lower fees due to their low risk clients. The evidence in Carter and Manaster (1991) shows that high reputation underwriters choose low risk clients in an attempt to protect their reputation.
underwriters charge higher fees for firms with more agency problems, supporting the need for underwriter monitoring in the IPO market.
Although Chen and Ritter (1999) do not specifically develop an underwriting fee model, their study is relevant in providing some factors potentially important in explaining how the fee is set. They find a strong clustering of underwriting fees at 7%, particularly for "moderate size"
IPOs (defined as those with proceeds of $20 million up to $80 million) issued over the period 1995 to 1998. They provide a number of explanations for three observations made of US underwriting spreads: (i) why are the US spread higher relative to other countries? (ii) why are the spreads clustered at 7%? and (iii) why there is an increased clustering of spread over time?
The explanation that they favour for the observed patterns in the spread is the strategic pricing (or implicit collusion) explanation, where underwriters act strategically to avoid turning IPO underwriting into a "commodity business" (p.13). That is, if underwriters were to compete aggressively on the basis of fees, this may result in underwriters charging lower spreads in the future, resulting in a lower present value of profits to the underwriting industry.
Hypotheses and Research Methods
Following Pugel and White (1988) and James (1992) , we use an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with the underwriter fee as the dependent variable. We identify the various determinants of the underwriter fee from previous studies and group them into the following six broad categories: (i) issue costs, (ii) ex ante offering risk, (iii) subscription period, (iv) reputation premium, (v) retained ownership and (vi) low balling effects. The underwriter fee model we propose in this paper also incorporates the institutional features of the Australian IPO market.
The model is summarised in the following regression:
FEE t = α 0 + α 1 ln(SIZE) t + α 2 AGE t + α 3 ln(ASSET) t +α 4 GROWTH t +α 5 SUBSCRIPTION t + α 6 UWRITER t + α 7 ALPHA t + α 8 REISSUE t + α 9 PIPO t + α 10 UWOPTION t + α 11 HOT t + α 12 INVPo+ α 13 CORPLAW t +ε t ----Equation (1) The above determinants are defined in Table 1 and are discussed below. The table also provides the sign of the expected relationship between the independent variables and the underwriting fee.
<Insert Table 1>
Previous US studies commonly refer to the fee that the underwriter receives as the underwriter spread, measured as the difference between the offer price and the per share proceeds to the IPO firm divided by the offer price. This spread would typically include management fees and selling concessions. Because of the standby agreement, issuers in Australia do not receive the IPO proceeds upfront (from the underwriter) but rather at the close of public subscriptions. As with other details of the issue, the underwriting spread must first be set and disclosed in the prospectus prior to its circulation. The underwriter spread comprises underwriting fee, management fee, and handling fee. These three fees are separately quoted on a per share gross proceed basis. In this paper, we focus on the underwriting fee, which compensates the underwriter for bearing the risk and cost for underwriting the issue. 6 Since not all issues are fully underwritten, the underwriter fee is therefore defined as the ratio of the dollar underwriting fee per underwritten share to the offer price.
Issue Costs
The role of the underwriter includes evaluating the issuer's growth perspective, setting the issue price and developing an identifiable market for the IPO. The incidence of costs in the underwriting process is obvious. Thus, issue costs become a fundamental consideration in the pricing of underwriting services. Here, they are proxied by the offer size.
Bhagat and Frost (1986), Booth and Smith (1986) and Bae and Levy (1990) document an economies of scale associated with issue size. Chen and Ritter (1999) document the same only for small (below $20 million) and large ($80 million or more) deals. In line with Pugel and White (1988) , we argue that the larger the dollar size of an issue, the more the fixed costs incurred in the underwriting process can be spread over each dollar of shares underwritten. The underwriter will, in turn, demand a lower underwriting fee per share for a larger issue.
The effect of issue size on the underwriting fee is further supported by lower search costs involved in underwriting larger issues. Essentially, an underwriter is employed to develop an identifiable clientele for the new issue. 7 Logue and Lindvall (1974) suggest that larger issues 6 Management fee compensates the lead underwriter mainly for managing the float (e.g., providing an advisory role in the preparation of the prospectus and participating in the due diligence committee) and finding retailers (i.e., a syndicate of subunderwriters) for the issue. To test whether there is a cross-subsidisation between underwriting and management fees, we include the management fee in our underwriting spread measure. The results are generally less significant than those reported in this paper. This suggests that our measure of underwriting fee better reflects the underwriting risk of the IPO. A handling fee provides a means of compensating the ASX for bearing their stamps or other acceptable identifications. The handling fee is payable by either the issuer or the underwriter. As the prospectus does not always state who is responsible for paying such fees, we exclude the handling fee from the underwriting fee in cases where we know that the underwriter is responsible for such fee. We reran the tests using this reduced sample. Given that the handling fee is typically set at 1% of the issue price, it is therefore not surprising that similar results are obtained. 7 See Kraus and Stoll (1972) , Hansen and Pinkerton (1982) and Mikkelson and Partch (1985) .
tend to be well sought-after by investors. They argue that investors are attracted to larger issue sizes as they have a more liquid post-offering market. Institutional investors are also more inclined to consider larger IPOs. Consequently, the amount of search costs incurred by the underwriter and thus the fee he charges for the public offering is expected to be lower for larger issues. Therefore, we hypothesise the following:
The larger the size of the offer, the lower the underwriting fee.
We measure the offer size, SIZE, as the product of the offer price and the number of underwritten shares offered. Table 2 shows that the average (median) offer size is $26.58 millions ($9.00 millions) stated at the 1998 dollar value.
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<Insert Table 2> 4
.2 Ex ante Offering Risk
In Australia, an issuer is guaranteed a fixed proceed (gross proceed minus the underwriting fee and other flotation costs) when he enters into an underwriting agreement. In contrast, the underwriter's net compensation is contingent in part upon the demand for the IPO. Mispricing the IPO may either lead to an insufficient demand requiring the underwriter to "soak up" any unsubscribed shares (i.e., overpricing) or "leave too much money on the table" to the detriment of the issuer (i.e., underpricing). Following Beatty and Ritter (1986) , we argue that in a multiperiod underwriting market, the underwriter cannot afford to misprice the issues too often; frequent overpricing will adversely affect his regular clientele of investors while excessive underpricing will impair his ability to attract future issuers. In this paper, we propose that the risk of mispricing is greater for IPOs with higher ex ante uncertainty, defined as the uncertainty that the market has about the valuation of the IPO.
The IPO literature provides us with a number of proxies for ex ante uncertainty. For example, Ritter (1984) , Wolfe and Cooperman (1990) and How et al (1995) show that larger and older IPO firms have lower ex ante uncertainty and are thus less underpriced. How et al (1995) claim that this is due in part to larger and older firms having more information available about them than smaller and younger IPO. For example, older firms have a longer business record than younger firms and, in Australia, older firms also have a greater incentive to voluntarily provide forecasts in their prospectus [Lee, Taylor, Yee and Yee (1991), and Chang, How, and Lim (1999) ].
The extent to which the underwriter can correctly "gauge" the issue price is dependent on the amount of information available about the IPO firm and is therefore higher for older and larger firms. Consistent with Pugel and White (1988) , we argue that the risk associated with underwriting larger and older IPOs is lower since the market is more familiar with them. As such, the demand for such issues will be higher. In short, we hypothesise that, other things being equal, older and larger companies pay a lower underwriting fee for their IPOs.
9 H2: The older the IPO firm, the lower the underwriting fee.
H3: The larger the firm size, the lower the underwriting fee.
We measure the firm's age (AGE) as the number of calendar days from incorporation to the date of the prospectus, and the firm's size (ASSET) as the pro forma value of total assets.
10 Table 2 shows that the average (median) age and total assets of our sample firms are 2755 days (346 days) and $75.35 millions ($23.61 millions) respectively.
Another proxy for ex ante uncertainty is growth potential vis-à-vis assets-in-place [How et al (1995) and Lee et al. (1996) ]. IPO firms with higher growth potential have greater ex ante uncertainty and are thus more difficult to price by the underwriter relative to IPO firms with lower growth potential. Therefore, we expect the likelihood of an underwriter mispricing an IPO decreases with the extent to which the firm value is represented by its assets-in-place.
Consequently, the underwriting fee charged to firms with higher growth potential is expected to be higher. We measure IPO firms' growth potential (GROWTH) by one minus the ratio of net tangible assets backing per share to the offer price. The average (median) of GROWTH is 0.44 (0.46) as shown in Table 2 .
H4: The higher the growth potential, the higher the underwriting fee.
9 It may also well be that larger issuers can obtain a lower per share underwriting fee due to their stronger bargaining power with the underwriter. 10 We also proxy firm size by the pro forma market capitalisation, computed by the product of the number of shares outstanding after the issue and the offer price. Given the high correlation between our measures of offer size and firm size (correlation coefficient is 0.78), only one of these variables is included in our regressions at one time.
Subscription Period
In Australia, the subscription period for the offer has to be stipulated in the prospectus prior to circulation. We expect the underwriter, in conjunction with the issuer, to set the subscription period in light of his expectation of the demand for the IPO. The underwriter is likely to negotiate a longer subscription period for issues that are expected to have low demand.
A longer subscription period may increase the probability of full subscription of an otherwise under-subscribed IPO, reducing the likelihood of the underwriter having to soak up any undistributed shares on the closing subscription date. Lee et al. (1996) note that the period between prospectus registration and the commencement of trading on the exchange reflects three distinct components: (i) a period between the prospectus registration and the opening subscription; (ii) a period between opening and closing subscription; and (iii) a period between closing subscription and the commencement of exchange trading. Since components (i) and (iii) are largely administrative and standardised, we use component (ii) to proxy for the level of expected demand (SUBSCRIPTION) 11 as it better reflects the expected time it takes for the issue to sell. 12 Table 2 shows that the average subscription period for our sample is 35 days with a median of 27 days.
H5:
The shorter the subscription period, the lower the underwriting fee.
Retained ownership
There are two opposing views on the relationship between retained ownership and the underwriting fee [Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) ]. The monitoring effect predicts a negative relationship between ownership and the underwriting fee. IPO firms with higher retained ownership have less agency costs [Jensen and Meckling (1973) ]. Therefore, the need for underwriter monitoring is reduced since insiders' incentives are more closely aligned with those of shareholders. The certification theory, on the other hand, suggests that information asymmetries and the resulting adverse selection problems at higher ownership levels result in higher fees being charged. The evidence in Jain and Kini (1999) shows that the underwriter spread is related to the demand for underwriter monitoring, which they proxy using management share ownership and institutional ownership.
In this paper, we also test whether retained ownership has an impact on the Australian underwriting fee structure. In the US, underwriters "certify" the issue and this requires them to bear the liability imposed by the Securities Act of 1933 for ensuring the fairness of the offer price [Booth and Smith (1986) and Jain and Kini (1999) ]. We argue that underwriters do not perform such certification function in Australia. By agreeing to underwrite the IPO at a set offer price, the underwriter in Australia only lends credibility to the IPO. In essence, he affirms the issue is priced "correctly" to reflect all information including potential adverse inside information [How (1994) ]. Therefore, we predict that the relationship between retained ownership and underwriting fee is driven mainly by the monitoring role rather than the certification role of the underwriter.
H6:
The higher the retained ownership after the IPO, the lower the underwriting fee.
Since information on the institutional ownership of IPO firms is not available, we test the underwriter monitoring role using the ownership retained by issuers after the IPO (ALPHA).
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The average percentage of shares retained by issuers after the IPO is 49.00% with a median of 52.00%, as shown in Table 2 .
Reputation of the underwriter
In a market characterised by information asymmetries, the quality of underwriting cannot be directly observed. Since high quality services demand a price premium [Simunic (1980) and Klein and Leffler (1980) ], the underwriter is left with ample opportunities to "cheat" by contracting to offer high quality services and charging higher fee but delivering low quality services. If this is the case, the underwriting market may be subject to a potential market failure as identified by Akerlof (1970) .
In a multi-period setting, we argue that the underwriter's opportunistic behaviour is not advantageous in the long-run because of reputation effects. That is, the underwriter's performance in any period has implications for future periods. If the long run performance of the underwriting services indicates that the underwriter has performed sub-standard work, the market will penalise him by reducing his ability to retain existing clients or attract new ones [Radner (1981) ]. In addition, evidence of low quality services can have an adverse effect on his professional reputation, and this, in turn, will result in changes in the market value of their services [Fama (1980) ]. Reputation, in this case, is a type of signalling activity since the market may plausibly use the quality of services provided in the past as a signal of present or future quality.
In line with the above studies, we propose that high quality underwriting services demand a price premium. The higher the quality of services provided, the higher is the underwriting fee.
This has support in Booth and Smith (1986) , Smith (1986) , and Beveniste and Spindt (1989) .
They argue that prestigious underwriters tend to bring more reputational assets to the issuance process and should thus be compensated more. Similarly, Gilson and Krakman (1984), Booth and Smith (1986) and Tinic (1988) advocate that prestigious underwriters tend to extract higher fees from issuers in order to maintain their investment in reputational capital. Also, How (1994) suggests that prestigious underwriters tend to charge a premium to reflect the higher quality services they provide.
High quality, within this context, refers to the underwriter's ability to price the IPO "correctly", satisfying both sides of the underwriter's clienteles [Beatty and Ritter (1986) ].
Therefore, we hypothesise that, ceteris paribus, underwriters with higher reputational capital charge higher fees.
H7:
The higher the reputation of the underwriter, the higher the underwriting fee.
We proxy the underwriter's reputation by the underwriter's market share, defined as the dollar value of all shares underwritten by the underwriter divided by the total dollar value of all IPOs in the sample (UWRITER). 14 For IPOs jointly underwritten by a syndicate of underwriters, the underwriter's market share is weighted by the proportion of shares underwritten. That is, if underwriters A and B are responsible for 80 percent and 20 percent, respectively, of the shares in a given IPO, then underwriter A is assigned 0.80 and underwriter B 0.20 of the offering.
Typically, the proportion is equal across joint underwriters. For joint underwriters, we choose the maximum underwriter's market share to proxy for the reputation of the underwriter to the issue.
Using market share as a proxy for reputation is based on the reputational capital paradigm, where high reputation firms have more customers because their present customers are satisfied with the quality of the services provided and will therefore not leave them for another.
Furthermore, "word-of-mouth" advertising results in more arrivals [Rogerson (1983) ]. Table 2 shows that our reputation metric ranges from 0.02% to 14.54%. It has an average of 3.94% and a median of 3.21%.
The Low Balling Effect
In order to assess the future prospects of the issue and therefore the issue price, the underwriter must first acquire relationship-specific assets [James (1992) ]. Likewise, in order to inform the issuer about the market, the underwriter must search and identify an informed client base for the new issue [Beveniste and Spindt (1989) and James (1992) ]. James (1992) argues that even though these start-up assets have enormous bearings on the marginal cost of the initial underwriting, they are likely to be durable for subsequent dealings. The underwriter is thus able to benefit from economies of scale and earn quasi-rents for subsequent dealings with the same issuer.
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Selecting an underwriter at the IPO thus creates a bi-lateral monopolistic relationship between the issuer and the underwriter. In competing to become the sole supplier of services, the underwriter will then provide a discount for the IPO fee. This discount will only be provided if the underwriter expects subsequent dealing(s) with the issuer. Once the bi-lateral monopolistic relationship is established, the underwriter can increase the price of subsequent transactions.
Hence, ceteris paribus, the IPO fee is hypothesised to be lower when the underwriter is more likely to market a subsequent offering for the issuer. 16 As in James (1992), we use a dummy variable, REISSUE, which takes a value of one for firms that issue a subsequent public offering within three years after listing and zero otherwise.
H8: Firms that issue subsequent seasoned offering(s) pay a lower underwriting fee for their IPOs.
15 Although the relationship-specific asset, by definition, is specific to a particular issuer, it is highly plausible that the client base identified for the new issue will be beneficial both for future issues by the same issuer as well as for other new issues. The lowballing effect focuses, however, only on the relationship-specific asset acquired through dealings with the issuer. 16 Beatty (1989) finds that low-balling effect and the risk premium hypothesis can coexist. For issuers that are likely to engage in subsequent audits, auditors are likely to charge a premium above the low balling fee to the extent that the continuing relationship is unlikely to discontinue as in the case of financial distress.
Control Variables

Package IPOs
Package IPOs (PIPOs) consist of IPOs of common stocks and options (or warrants).
Arguably, PIPOs are more complex to value than shares-only IPOs. Pugel and White (1988) find that the complexity of an issue affects the underwriting fee charged. Here we consider the possibility that the underwriter may price their services differently for share-only IPOs and PIPOs.
17
Due to the inherent uncertainty of PIPOs [How and Howe (1997] , we expect underwriters to demand a higher compensation for underwriting such issues. However, How and Howe find that most of these options are issued at the money and listed in the prospectus as being "free of charge". This implies that options in PIPOs may act as a sweetener that attracts subscriptions of IPOs, thus making it easier for the underwriter to sell the issue. If this is the case, the underwriter may lower their fee. The impact of the choice of offer method on the fee model is thus ambiguous and we control for it using a dummy variable PIPO, which takes a value of one if the firm issues PIPOs and zero otherwise.
Underwriter Options
Underwriters may also receive options as part of their compensation scheme. These options allow the underwriter to acquire a fixed number of shares of the issuer's stock at a prescribed exercise price and time period. Interviews with Australian underwriters reveal that underwriter options are typically issued by high-risk IPOs offered by younger and smaller firms.
Our legislative setting with respect to underwriter option is inherently different from that in the US. In the US, the underwriter's compensation is limited to a certain percentage of the gross issue proceeds from the offering by the "blue sky law". 18 The issue of options in the US thus provides a means to circumvent regulations and compensate underwriters for underwriting a more risky issue. Although such a regulation is absent in Australia, it does not necessarily imply that underwriters do not substitute underwriter options for compensation. 19 We therefore control for the possible impact of underwriter options on the fee charged using a dummy variable, UWOPTION, which takes a value of one for firms that issue options to compensate the underwriter and zero otherwise.
Market States
The substantially high initial returns documented in the hot issue market appear to have a cyclical component [Ritter (1984) and How et al. (1995) ]. Davis and Yeomans (1974) and Logue and Lindvall (1974) suggest that unstable markets are associated with larger pricing errors. These, in turn, increase the underwriter's risk of holding undistributed issues [Pugel and White (1988) , Muhammad, Iftekhar, and Smith (1996) ]. Conversely, favourable market conditions (i.e., a rising, less volatile stock market and relatively low stable interest rates) decrease both the risk and cost of underwriting IPOs. Accordingly, market volatility is likely to affect the pricing of underwriting services.
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We adopt a method similar to that of Ritter (1984) 
Offer Price
Primarily, the underwriter performs two functions in an IPO: underwriting and setting the offer price [Newman (1983) ]. In the US, Logue and Lindvall (1974) suggest that there is a tradeoff between the offer price and the underwriting commission. They argue that, ceteris paribus, a higher issue price is more likely to have a prolonged issue period and a greater chance of the underwriter suffering from capital loss in the event of under-subscription. If the issue price is determined simultaneously with the underwriting fee, the underwriter will negotiate a higher fee as the underwriter requires greater risk-bearing compensation for a higher issue price.
Likewise, the underwriter will be willing to settle for a lower fee if the offer price is low. A low offer price is likely to speed up the distribution period and lower the likelihood of under-20 Large volumes of IPOs are also observed in hot market period. Since there is a peak in the number of firms that went public around the boom period [How et al. (1995) ], we expect these market variables to also capture the effect of competition amongst underwriters. From the sell-side perspective, the underwriter may require to expend more effort in marketing and distributing the new issue at times of intensive competition. The underwriters would thus demand higher underwriting fee for issues subscription. 21 Consistent with James (1992), we use the inverse of the offer price (INVPo) as a control variable in our model. This variable has a mean of 1.43 and a median of 0.92.
Corporations Law
The Corporations Law, which began operation on 1 January 1991, brought about a number of important changes to the prospectus regulation that are likely to affect the underwriting fees charged in Australia. One of these major changes is to include the underwriter(s) named in the prospectus as a person liable for false and misleading statements in the prospectus (Sections 1006-1007). The perceived increased litigation risk is expected to increase the fee that underwriters charge in the post-Corporations Law period. We use a dummy variable to control for the changing statutory regime. This variable (CORPLAW) has a value of one if the IPO was listed after the introduction of the Corporations Law in 1991 and zero otherwise.
Data and Sample Profile
To ensure that only "unseasoned" issues are included in our sample, we excluded from our sample foreign owned or affiliated companies; companies either previously listed on or registered in a foreign stock exchange before becoming listed on the ASX; companies formed through a Scheme of Arrangement; unit trusts; and privatised public sector entities.
We identify a total of 282 underwritten industrial IPO listings in Australia from 1980 to 1996 for which we have a copy of the prospectus. Although not reported, the majority of our sample firms (73.40%) were underwritten by a single underwriter. The maximum number of underwriters associated with our sample IPOs is eight.
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Information on the financial characteristics of the firm at the time of the IPO, the name of the lead underwriter, the underwriting fee, the subscription and prospectus dates were all manually collected from prospectuses. Daily share prices are provided by the ASX STATEX database. To test the low balling effect, we require data on subsequent seasoned offerings made within three years after the IPO. Because of this, we have chosen 1 January 1996 as the end of our sample period. Information on subsequent SEO was obtained from the ASX datadisc in the underwritten during the bullish market [Logue and Lindvall (1974) ]. However, it is also likely that the market during the bullish market would be more liquid, it would therefore be easier for underwriters to place their IPO shares. 21 Here, implicit in our argument is an association between the degree of underpricing and the underwriting fee. Chen and Ritter (1999) find weak evidence of a tradeoff between underpricing and spread. We also test this, replacing offer price with underpricing in the equation. Our results show that, as with the offer price, underpricing is significant in explaining the underwriting fee. The results are thus generally similar to those reported. 22 A syndicate of underwriters helps to spread the risk of underwriting. We test whether the underwriting fee is lower for counderwritten IPOs relative to those IPOs underwritten by a single underwriter. The results are not significant.
"Announcements" (full text) section. We also obtain information on whether an underwriter or a lead manager was employed in the SEO from the SDC platinum.
<Insert Table 3>   Table 3 reports the underwriting fee by industry and year of listing. For the full sample, the average underwriting fee is 3.68% with a median of 3.66%. It ranges from 1.00% to 8.00%. Chen and Ritter (1999) find that the underwriter spread is clustered at 7% within a certain range of issue size, and this clustering is more prominent than a decade ago. We test whether this pattern is present in the Australian underwriting fee structure. Figures A and B plot the underwriting fee against issue size and time respectively. In sharp contrast to the US evidence, the plots show that underwriting fees in Australia vary across issue size and over time.
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Although there is a clustering of fees at 3%, 4% and 5%, the underwriting fee is definitely not fixed at one particular percentage.
<Insert Figures A and B> <Insert Table 4> 6.0 Results Table 4 reports univariate results of differences in underwriting fees using t-tests and nonparametric Mann-Whitney tests. The underwriting fees are significantly different for all our categorical variables except for REISSUE. Panel A shows that there are 46 companies (16%) that issue package IPOs in our sample. PIPO firms pay significantly higher underwriting fees than firms issuing shares-only IPOs. This may reflect the complexity and/or the inherent risk of PIPOs relative to a "pure vanilla" (i.e., shares-only) IPOs.
<Insert Table 5> IPO companies that issue underwriter options pay significantly higher fees than those that do not (Panel B). This underwriting compensation scheme (UWOPTION) is however not a popular means of paying underwriters in our sample. Only about 7.47% of our sample firms provide options to their underwriters.
In contrast to James (1992) , our univariate tests do not support the prediction of the low balling hypothesis. About 47% of our sample return to the market for subsequent equity offerings within three years after the IPO, consistent with Chelliah, How, and Izan (1996) . Panel C indicates that companies with an SEO within three years subsequent to listing (i.e., repeated issuers) pay slightly higher underwriting fees than companies that do not, the difference in fees is 23 Using alternative measures of underwriting spreads, as discussed in footnote six, we observe similar patterns.
however not statistically significant. More than half of our sample were listed during the hot issue period (57%) and Panel (D) shows that these firms pay significantly higher underwriting fees than firms going public during the "cold" period.
About 60% of firms in our sample were listed during the pre-Corporations Law period.
Earlier, we proposed that the underwriter's fee may increase after the introduction of the Corporations Law, reflecting the higher potential litigation risk. Contrary to our expectation, Panel (E) shows that issuers pay significantly higher underwriting fees in the pre-Corporations
Law period than in the post-Corporations Law period. One possible explanation for this is the statutory defence provided by section 1011 of the Law to preparers of prospectus if reasonable precautions have been taken and due diligence has been exercised to ensure that all statements included in the prospectus are true and not misleading and no material omission. In addition, it is common to find indemnity clauses in the underwriting agreement where the issuer agrees to indemnify the underwriter against any liabilities arising out of the prospectus.
In Table 5 , results from OLS regressions are presented. Only independent variables that are significant in Regression I are included in Regression II. As reported in the table, the presence of heteroscedasticity was corrected using White's (1980) method. To recap, the dependent variable is the underwriting fee, measured as per underwritten share underwriting fee to the offer price.
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<Insert Table 5> Our underwriting fee model explains about 15% of the variation in underwriting fees in Australia. We find issue size has a significant influence on underwriting fees. The negative coefficient on SIZE is consistent with previous findings and supports hypothesis H1 that IPO firms with larger issue size pay significantly lower underwriting fees. Our results appear to support the economies of scale argument proposed by several authors including Smith (1979) , Bhagat and Frost (1986) and Bae and Levy (1990) , and the proposition that larger issues are associated with lower per share search cost [Logue and Lindvall (1974) ].
The firm's age (AGE) and growth potential vis-à-vis assets-in-place (GROWTH) proxy for ex ante offering risk in Table 5 25 . AGE has a negative coefficient, suggesting that younger firms are associated with higher underwriting fee. GROWTH has a positive coefficient, suggesting that 24 Although not reported, none of the correlations between the independent variables are strongly correlated. Therefore, multicollinearity is not a problem in our data. 25 Another proxy for ex ante offering risk is firm size, measured by total assets and market capitalisation of the IPO firm. As noted in footnote 10, we have excluded firm size from the tests as it is highly correlated with issue size. Although not reported, we have also run the regressions using firm size in place of issue size. Results similar to those reported using issue size are found. Our results suggest that underwriters will charge a lower underwriting fee for larger firms. Given that there are more IPO companies with higher growth potential vis-à-vis assets-in-place pay higher underwriting fees. However, the associations between these two variables and underwriting fees are not significant.
As expected, the subscription period which proxies for the level of demand (SUBSCRIPTION) is significantly positively related to the underwriting fee. Consistent with our conjecture (Hypothesis H5), underwriters will negotiate for a longer subscription period if they perceive the expected demand for the IPO is low. Ceteris paribus, a higher underwriting fee will be charged for these IPOs given that the probability of the underwriter having to meet the shortfall in demand at the closing subscription is higher for these firms than for firms with higher expected demand. We expect the underwriter to set a lower subscription period for the latter.
UWRITER has a positive coefficient. This is consistent with the reputation premium argument proposed in Hypothesis H7, which predicts that more reputable underwriters charge higher fees. However, the relationship is no significant.
Retained ownership (ALPHA) is significantly and negatively related to underwriting fees. This is consistent with Hypothesis H6 and Jain and Kini (1999) . The Australian evidence shows that the relationship between retained ownership and underwriting fee is driven mainly by the monitoring role rather than the certification role of the underwriter.
Our results for the control variables are generally consistent with those obtained in Table 4 . Table 5 shows that underwriters do not appear to systematically price PIPOs differently from shares-only IPOs. UWOPTION is positive and significant, proving evidence that IPO firms which compensate underwriters with options pay significantly higher underwriting fees. This may suggest that companies that compensate their underwriter with options are associated with greater underwriting risk.
HOT takes the value of one for IPO listed during the Australian hot issue period, and zero otherwise. Table 5 shows that the state of the IPO market is not a significant consideration in pricing underwriting services in Australia. INVPo is significant, suggesting a trade off between the offer price and the underwriting fee. This is consistent with Logue and Lindvall (1974) . In contrast, CORPLAW is not significant in our multivariate analysis. Therefore, the introduction of the Corporations Law in 1991 does not appear to have any significant impact on the underwriting fee structure.
information available for larger firms, underwriters are able to better gauge the offer price of these firms than that of smaller firms for which less information is available.
In Table 5 , we also test the low balling effect by examining whether the underwriting fees paid by IPO firms that return to the equity market three years after the IPO are significantly different from those that do not. The estimated coefficient for REISSUE is not significant, implying that the difference in fee is not significant across the two groups of firms.
We provide further test of the low balling effect, noting that the SEOs examined by James (1992) are all public offerings. In contrast, subsequent public offerings are not a popular means for raising funds in Australia. Chelliah et al. document that repeated issues typically take the form of a rights issue or a private placement. As not all these issues require the services of an underwriter (e.g., in the issues of non-renounceable rights and placement directly placed by directors), our proxy for REISSUE may be biased against finding the importance of low balling effect in explaining the variances in underwriting fees.
We therefore identify a sample of companies for which we know whether there was an underwriter or lead manager involved in the SEO. We managed to obtain such information for 99 firms. Of these, 53 (53.53%) firms returned to the equity market within three years after listing, but only 26 of them engaged an underwriter or a lead manager. We retest low balling by assigning a value of one to the 26 firms and zero otherwise (captured by the dummy variable REISSUE*). The results are reported in Regression III in Table 5 . The regression shows that REISSUE* is of the right sign (i.e., negative) but not significant.
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We propose an explanation based on the Australian institutional environment for the lack of support for the low balling effect in the Australian underwriting market. This institutional explanation revolves around the tax treatment for start-up expenses, which is different in Australia than in the US. In the US, these start-up expenses are not tax deductible. Thus, issuers may prefer to pay a lower underwriting fee in their initial engagement with the underwriter. For the underwriter, this initial fee reduction can later be recouped in the form of higher future quasirent, which is tax deductible to the issuer. In Australia, firms are able to immediately expense or amortise these start-up costs and deduct them for tax purposes. As there are no incentives to defer the payment of these expenses to later periods, this may explain why the low balling effect may not be as significant in Australia as it is in the US.
Conclusion
Recent media releases have put enormous strains on the credibility of the underwriting industry. The results of this study are much to our comfort for two reasons. First, we find that, in contrast to recent US evidence in Chen and Ritter (1999) Overall, we do not find evidence that underwriters in Australia fix or collude underwriting fees. Our results in fact suggest that underwriting services in Australia are priced to compensate underwriters for bearing the cost and the risk of suffering capital loss in the event of undersubscription -a feature that is unique in standby underwriting agreements. Descriptive statistics for determinants of the fee model using a final sample size of 476 underwritten IPOs. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the product of offer price and the number of ordinary shares offered in the issue. ASSET is the natural logarithm of total assets pro forma. AGE is the number of calendar days from incorporation to the date of prospectus. GROWTH is one minus the net tangible assets backing per share. SUBSCR. is the number of calender days from the date of opening subscriptions to the date of closing subscription. UWrep is the maximum weighted dollar value of all shares underwritten by a given underwriter divided by the total dollar value of all IPOs in our sample. ALPHA is one minus the number of shares in the prospectus as a percentage of total shares outstanding after the IPO. INVPo is the inverse of offer price. All dollar values are restated at 1998 dollars. The dependent variable is the underwriting fee, measured as the per share underwriting fee to offer price. SIZE, is measured as the product of offer price and the number of shares on issue. AGE is the number of calendar days from incorporation to the date of prospectus. GROWTH is one minus the net tangible assets backing per share. The number of calender days between opening and closing subscription is denoted by SUBSCRIPTION. The underwriters reputation, UWRITER, is measured as the maximum weighted dollar value of all shares underwritten divided by the total dollar value of all IPOs. ALPHA is one minus the number of shares offered in the prospectus as a percentage of total shares outstanding after the IPO. REISSUE takes a value of one if the firm issues equity three years subsequent to their IPO, zero otherwise. REISSUE* takes the value of one if the firm involves an underwriter as a lead manager or underwriter in its subsequent equity offeirng. PIPO takes a value of one if firms issue options with their offerings, zero otherwise. UWOPTION takes a value of one if firms issue options as part of their compensation to underwriters, zero otherwise. MINING takes a value of one if firms are in the mining industry, zero otherwise. HOT takes the value of one for firms listed during the period Nov 1984 to just before the crash and January 1982 to August 1993, and zero otherwise. INVPo is the inverse of the offer price. REGULATE takes the value of one for firms listed prior to 1 April 1984, and zero otherwise. CORPLAW takes the value of one for firms listed in the post-Corporations Law period, zero otherwise. Whites (1980) corrected T-values are stated in parentheses. For variables with predicted signs, one tailed test is used to determine the significance level; otherwise, a two-tailed test is employed. * denotes coefficient being significant at the 0.05 level ** denotes coefficient being significant at the 0.01 level *** denotes coefficient being significant at the 0.001 level. Tim e
